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CVE detail

CVE-2026-46242

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.

CVSS 7.8 · HighBuzz score 47.1

Buzz score

Why this CVE is surfacing

Buzz score total 47.1

This all-time snapshot uses the same composite formula as Trending across a 30-year evidence window, rather than a current rolling window.

Buzz score components · mention 27.1 · diversity 20.0 · KEV 0.0 · OTX 0.0 · PoC 0.0
Mention score
27.1
14 evidence mentions in the snapshot
Diversity score
20.0
8 sources across 5 categories
KEV score
0.0
No KEV entry observed
OTX score
0.0
0 OTX pulses
PoC score
0.0
0 repos · best confidence N/A
Best PoC traction
0
Maximum stars on a matched PoC repo

Why it matters now

Mention timeline

Total mentions
6
within the 30d window
Peak daily
4
highest bucket

Evidence

Source links by recency

Newest mentions first
14 source links · newest first

Exploit code

Public exploit repository references

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0 repository references · best confidence N/A · max 0 stars
No public PoC repositories have been matched yet.

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