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CVE detail

CVE-2026-63803

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree() in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside attach_hdlc_protocol(). The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(), is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the ->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory, leading to a use-after-free. Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev) before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync() now runs on both free paths. timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown. Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync() operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list twice. This bug was found by static analysis.

CVSS 7.8 · HighBuzz score 32.0

Buzz score

Why this CVE is surfacing

Buzz score total 32.0

This all-time snapshot uses the same composite formula as Trending across a 30-year evidence window, rather than a current rolling window.

Buzz score components · mention 22.0 · diversity 10.0 · KEV 0.0 · OTX 0.0 · PoC 0.0
Mention score
22.0
8 evidence mentions in the snapshot
Diversity score
10.0
2 sources across 2 categories
KEV score
0.0
No KEV entry observed
OTX score
0.0
0 OTX pulses
PoC score
0.0
0 repos · best confidence N/A
Best PoC traction
0
Maximum stars on a matched PoC repo

Why it matters now

Mention timeline

Total mentions
8
within the 30d window
Peak daily
7
highest bucket

Evidence

Source links by recency

Newest mentions first
8 source links · newest first

Exploit code

Public exploit repository references

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