CVE detail

CVE-2026-63892

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: property: Reject dir_len < 4 to prevent size_t underflow On the non-root path, __tb_property_parse_dir() takes dir_len from entry->length (u16 widened to size_t). Two distinct OOB conditions follow when entry->length < 4: 1. The non-root path begins with kmemdup(&block[dir_offset], sizeof(*dir->uuid), ...) which always reads 4 dwords from dir_offset. tb_property_entry_valid() only enforces dir_offset + entry->length <= block_len, so a crafted entry with dir_offset close to the end of the property block and entry->length in 0..3 passes that gate but lets the UUID copy run off the block (e.g. dir_offset = 497, dir_len = 3 in a 500-dword block reads block[497..501]). 2. After the kmemdup, content_len = dir_len - 4 underflows size_t to ~SIZE_MAX, nentries becomes SIZE_MAX / 4, and the entry walk runs OOB on each iteration until an entry fails validation or the kernel oopses on an unmapped page. Reject dir_len < 4 on the non-root path *before* the UUID kmemdup, which closes both holes. Also move INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dir->properties) up to immediately after the dir allocation so the new error-return path (and the existing uuid-alloc failure path) calling tb_property_free_dir() sees a walkable list rather than the zero-initialized NULL next/prev that list_for_each_entry_safe() would oops on.